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BRIEF STATEMENT RE APPELLATE JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final decision in a civil matter
originating in the Second District Court, Davis County, Utah. This
case was originally filed in the Utah Supreme Court and the case
was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS APPEAL
On cross appeal, Defendant requests attorney's fees and costs.
Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees and costs based on the
following grounds: 1) under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule
33, since Plaintiff filed a frivolous appeal that it is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a
good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law and
is one interposed for improper purpose, 2) under Utah Rules of
Civil

Procedure

Plaintiff

68(b)

since

Defendant

offered

settlement to

(R.194-195) which was more than what Plaintiff was

awarded at trial, (Amended Findings of Fact, p. 8, no. 4 ) , and 3)
under Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-18

since Defendant was the

prevailing party under Utah's Mechanic Lien Law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a case on appeal from the Second Judicial District
Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah.
In July, 1989, Stacey B. and Kristin P. Morgan (hereinafter
referred to as Defendants) met with Don Smith at which time it was
agreed that Don Smith would furnish flooring at or near cost for a
1

home Defendants were purchasing and Defendants agreed to furnish
air conditioning for Don Smith at or near cost.

(R.T.P. 53, 139-

143) .
Don Smith showed Defendants carpet samples and left samples
with Defendant for final selection.

When Defendants had made a

selection and the date for closing on Defendant's house neared,
Defendants were told by Don Smith to contact Floor Coverings by
Certified, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Plaintiff) in order to
arrange for the installation of the carpet and vinyl.

(R.T.P. 55,

144-147).
Defendant contacted Plaintiff concerning the carpet and vinyl.
Defendant gave Plaintiff the previously selected carpet and vinyl
order numbers.

Defendant also discussed with Plaintiff where in

the house the vinyl and carpet should be laid.

(R.T.P. 12-15, 149-

151) .
Later, Plaintiff, without Defendants, went to the home being
purchased

by

Defendants

and

Plaintiff

measured

determine the amount of carpet and vinyl required.

the

home to

(R.T.P 13-14).

Defendants believed that they were entering into a contract
with Don Smith concerning the purchase of the vinyl and carpet and
the selling of an air conditioner to Don Smith. However, Plaintiff
believed that they were entering into a contract with Defendant for
the purchase and sell of vinyl and carpet.

(Amended Findings of

Fact, p. 2, no. 4).
On or about November 15, 16 and 17, 1989, Plaintiff installed
the carpet and vinyl in the home Defendants were purchasing.
2

(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 2, no. 3).
On or about November 24, 1992, Plaintiff purchased the home
located at 773 South 825 East, Layton, Utah in Davis County.
closing

on

November

24,

1989,

the

Defendants

paid

At

Miles

Construction Company $1,500.00 for the purchase and installation of
the carpet and vinyl for their home.
3, no. 9 ) .

(R.T.P 155-156).

(Amended Findings of Fact, p.

Later, Miles Construction Company

gave the Defendants $1,500.00 for the carpet and vinyl for their
home.

(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 3, no. 10).
Plaintiff billed Defendant $11.25 per yard for the purchase

and installation of carpet and $9.75 per yard for the purchase and
installation of vinyl, for a total amount of $2,115.00.

(Amended

Findings of Fact, p. 2, no. 5 and p. 3, no. 11).
Defendants disagreed with the amcpunt Plaintiff had billed
them.

They felt they were charged for. more yardage of carpet and

vinyl than they actually received.
the

prices

to

be

paid

to

Also, Defendant thought that

Plaintiff

for

the

purchase

and

installation of the carpet was $10.75 per yard and $9.75 per yard
to purchase and install the vinyl.

(Amended Findings of Fact, p.

2, no. 6). (R.T.P. 152-155).
Attempts were made to determine the correct amount owing and
Defendant received a $75.00 credit.

(R.T.P. 156).

Plaintiff mailed a Preliminary Notice of Intent to File a Lien
to the Defendants about January 3, 1990.

(R.115-116). On January

19, 1990, Floor Coverings caused a Notice of Lien to be filed with
the Office of the Davis County Recorder (Entry No. 880784, Book
3

1332, Page 818, hereinafter "Notice of Lien").

(R.l-20).

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendants in the Second
Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of Utah on
March 15, 1990 requesting relief based on Utah's Mechanic Lien
Statute, Breach of Contract, Failure to obtain Bond and Quantum
Meruit.
Defendants sent to Plaintiff a pro se answer.

(R.21-22).

Later, on June 12, 1990, (51 days prior to judgment and 126 days
prior to the sheriff's sale), Defendants sent Plaintiff's attorney
a check for $2,040.00 to be applied towards the vinyl and carpet
installed in their home by Plaintiff.

(Amended Findings of Fact,

p. 3, no. 13).
On July 2, 1990, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
or, in the Alternative, for an Order Determining Uncontroverted
Facts and to Strike Answer and for Entry of Default Judgment.
Plaintiff's attorney filed Affidavits on his Motion for Summary
Judgment wherein it was alleged that no money had been received
from Defendants.

The trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment and Judgment was entered on August 1, 1990
awarding Plaintiffs, $3,855.10, which included the principal sum of
$2,040.00, despite the fact that said amount had already been
received by Plaintiff's attorney.

(R. 23-77).

On October 18, 1990, Defendants home was sold at a sheriff's
sale

and

$3,855.10.

the

property

was bid

(R.78-79; 98-100).

by

Plaintiff's

attorney

for

Plaintiff's attorney specifically

stated at the sale that the bid $3,855.10 was due and owing on the
4

judgment.

(R.80-101).

Defendants attorney at the sale asked Plaintiff's attorney to
give Defendants credit for $2,040.00 which was previously received.
Plaintiff's attorney insisted that no check was received and that
the full amount of the judgment of $3,855.10 was owing.

(R.80-

101) .
Defendants check for $2,040.00 was deposited by Plaintiff's
attorney after the sheriff's sale.

(R.111-113).

Defendant's attorney motioned the lower court for a temporary
restraining order to restrain the Davis County Sheriff's Office
from disposing of the $3,855.10 received by Plaintiff at the sale.
The court found that the actions of Plaintiff's attorney were
outrageous and granted a temporary restraining order.

(R.T.P. 15,

R.96-103).
Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment which
was granted by the court.

(R.80-96; 104-114? 135-136; 140-42).

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment or In the
Alternative to Strike Defendant's Unsigned Answer, which was
denied.

(R.123-125; 127-129; 146-155; 168-176; 196-197; 201-203).

A pretrial conference was set for March 25, 1991 at 9:45 a.m.
At the pretrial conference both counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant
were present.

The Court having reviewed the file and discussed

matters with counsel, ordered that the issues for trial were to be
as follows:

1) Whether or not the mechanics lien is valid, 2)

Whether or not the invoice and lien reflects the amount of carpet
and linoleum installed in Defendant's house, and 3) Whether either
5

party is entitled to attorney fees and how much.

(R.158; 198-200) .

Trial was held before the Honorable Judge Cornaby without a
jury on May 31, 1991.

After counsel were given a chance for

opening arguments, Plaintiff motioned the court In Limine to
preclude Defendants from presenting evidence regarding issues which
were not affirmatively plead.

(R.T.P. 2 ) .

After hearing argument of counsel, (R.T.P. 2-6) the court
determined that the determining question is whether the parties
had notice prior to this time as to what the issues were going to
be.

The court said that determining the issues was one of the

primary purposes of the pretrial. Since the parties had notice of
the

issues

from

the pre-trial

Plaintiff's motion.

conference, the

court

denied

(R.T.P. 6).

After the trial was concluded, the court ruled that the amount
listed as owing on the Notice of Lien is incorrect.

(Amended

Findings of Fact, p. 6, no. 23). That the lien statute does not
require privity between the parties and Plaintiff properly listed
the Defendants as the owner or reputed owner of the property.
(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 6, no. 25).

That the corporate

officer did not state under oath that the contents of the lien were
correct.

(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 6, no. 26).

Plaintiff

incorrectly listed the person by whom he was employed even though
he believed the Defendants were the ones that hired him.

(Amended

Findings of Fact, p. 7, no. 27). That the lien was unenforceable.
(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 7, no. 28).
That no one testified as to whether or not there was a bond in
6

place.

However, the Court assumed that there was no bond.

(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 6, no. 24). The court found that
there was no contract between Plaintiff and Defendant and therefore
no bond was required.

(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 2, no. 8 and

Amended Findings of Fact, p. 8, no. 4).
That even though there was no contract between the parties,
(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 2, no. 8 ) , Plaintiff was entitled to
judgment on the basis of unjust enrichment.

(Amended Findings of

Fact, p. 7, no. 29). The Court during trial heard testimony as to
the value of goods and services received and after weighing the
testimony (Amended Findings of Fact, p. 5, no. 19 and 20; p. 6, no.
2 0-26; p. 7, no. 27-29) the court determined that the amount
Plaintiff was to be paid for unjust enrichment was $1,800.00 plus
$40.00 preparation and sales tax of $119.60 for a total amount to
be paid of $1,959.60.

(Amended Findings of Fact, p. 7, no. 29).

That Plaintiff had in his possession $2,040.00 of Plaintiff's
money meaning the Plaintiff owes the Defendant $80.40.

(Amended

Findings of Fact, p. 7, no. 30). That each party is to bear their
own attorney's fees and costs incurred herein.

(Amended Findings

of Fact, p. 7, no. 31).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff asserts that the lower court erred for the following
reasons:

1) Defendants waived their right to assert certain

defenses, 2) trial court improperly denied Plaintiff's mechanic's
lien claim, 3) a judgment should have been entered against the
7

Defendants

for

failure

to

have

a

contractors

bond,

and

4)

Defendants should not have been permitted to assert defenses at
trial because they did not sign their answer as required by Rule
11.
Plaintifffs allegations are without merit since the trial
court properly granted judgment to Plaintiff on the basis of unjust
enrichment. First, Defendants did not waive their right to assert
certain defenses as proposed by Plaintiff since the issues in
question

were

not

affirmative

Plaintiff's prima facie case.

defenses

but

rather

part

of

Second, the trial court properly

denied Plaintiff's mechanic's lien claim since the Notice of Lien
did not meet statutory requirements since the Notice of Lien was
not properly verified. Third, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief
based on Utah's payment bond statute since there was no contract
between Plaintiff and Defendant and therefore the statute does not
apply.

Fourth, Plaintiff cannot assert that Defendants should not

have been allowed to present evidence in support of their defenses
at the trial on the basis that Stacey Morgan signed the answer
prior to trial. Also, the Plaintiff is barred from raising these
issues on appeal since the issues were not properly preserved for
appeal.
On cross appeal, Defendant requests attorney's fees and costs.
Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees and costs based on the
following grounds: 1) under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule
33, since Plaintiff filed a frivolous appeal that it is not
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a
8

good faith argument to extend, modify or reverse existing law and
is one interposed for improper purpose, 2) under Utah Rules of
Civil

Procedure

Plaintiff

68(b) since

Defendant

offered

settlement to

(R. 194-95) which was more than what Plaintiff was

awarded at trial, (Amended Findings of Fact, p. 8, no. 4) and 3)
under Utah

Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-18

since Defendant was the

prevailing party under Utah's Mechanic Lien Law.

ARGUMENT
The lower court awarded judgment in favor of Plaintiff on the
basis of unjust enrichment. Plaintiff asserts that the lower erred
for the following reasons:
assert

certain

defenses,

1) Defendants waived their right to
2)

trial

court

improperly

denied

Plaintiff's mechanic's lien claim, 3) a judgment should have been
entered against the Defendants for failure to have a contractors
bond, and 4) Defendants should not have been permitted to assert
defenses at trial because they did not sign their answer as
required by Rule 11. However, Plaintiff's allegations are without
merit and the court properly granted judgment to Plaintiff on the
basis of unjust enrichment.

1.

Affirmative Defenses Do Not Include Elements of a Plaintiff's

Prima Facie Case.
Plaintiff asserts that the validity of the Notice of Lien, and
other issues concerning non-compliance with the Mechanic's Lien
statute should not have been brought up at trial since such issues
9

are affirmative defenses and were not plead in Defendants1 answer.
However, since Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant based
on the Mechanic's Lien statute (R.l-20), failure to follow the
requirements of the statute are not affirmative defenses but rather
part of Plaintiff's prima facie case.
In American jurisprudence, a Plaintiff has the burden of
pleading and proving all the elements of its prima facie case. In
the case before this Court, Plaintiff's Complaint was based in
part, by a claim that Plaintiff was entitled to relief based on
Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute. Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-1, et seq.
(1953, as amended).
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-1, et seq. (1953, as amended),
("hereinafter Mechanic's Lien statute")' sets forth the requirements
that must be met prior to a claimant obtaining any of the benefits
provided by the statute.
"Mechanic's liens are purely statutory, and lien claimants may
only acquire a lien by complying with the statutory provisions
authorizing them." Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift, 798
P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1990), quoting Utah Sav. & Loan Assoc, v.
Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 338; 366 P.2d 598, 600 (1961).
Since a claimant must comply with the statutory provisions
prior to obtaining a lien, Utah's Mechanic's Lien statute sets
forth the elements of Plaintiff's prima facie case. No relief can
be granted prior to Plaintiff pleading and proving the required
elements contained in the statute.
One of the requirements prior to obtaining relief under Utah's
10

Mechanicfs Lien statute is that a proper Notice of Lien be filed.
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-7(2), (1953 as amended).

A Notice of

Lien that is improper is invalid and will not be enforced.
Worthinaton

& Kimball Construction Company et al. v. C & A

Development Company, 777 P.2d 475 (Utah 1989), First Sec. Mortgage
Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981), Graff v. Boise Cascade
Corp. 660 P.2d 721 (Utah 1983).
Objections to a plaintiff's prima facie case are preserved by
denials

of the

allegations

contained

within

the

Plaintiff's

complaint and it is not required to set forth such denials as
affirmative defenses.
"A defense that merely controverts plaintiff's prima
facie case is negative in character and should be pleaded
in accordance with Rule 8(b) and Rule 8(c) then becomes
inapplicable, for an affirmative defense raises matters
outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie case. . .
.Therefore, any matter that does- not tend to controvert
the opposing party's prima facie case shall be pleaded,
and is not put in issue by a denial made pursuant to Rule
8(b)" General Ins. Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty
Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976).
Plaintiff's contention that it cart obtain relief under the
Mechanic's Lien statute without proving that it complied with the
statute's requirements is wrong. The statute sets forth the prima
facie elements of Plaintiff's case.

Failure to comply with the

statute's requirements is not an affirmative defense, but rather
part of Plaintiff's prima facie case. Plaintiff has the burden of
proving that it complied with the statute's requirements.

2.

Plaintiff's Notice of Lien was Improper and did not meet the
11

Requirements of Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law.
Plaintiff

asserts that the trial

court

improperly

denied

Plaintiff's mechanic's lien claim, since the requirements of the
statute were met since it substantially complied with the statute's
requirements. Although substantial compliance is allowed under the
law, the trial court properly found the Mechanic's Lien Statute
does not apply since the Notice of Lien was invalid due to improper
verification, incorrect amount requested and Plaintiff incorrectly
listed the person by whom he was employed.
As in this case, improper verification alone is sufficient to
support a finding that the Mechanic's Lien Statute does not apply
since the Notice was defective.
filed

by

the

Plaintiff

was

In this case, the Notice of Lien
improper

since

to

have

a

valid

verification as required by statute, the claimant, rather than
notary, must sign that the contents are true.
sign that the

contents

of the

Plaintiff did not

Lien were true, and

therefore

according to recent case law, the Lien is invalid and cannot be
enforced.
Utah's Mechanic Lien statute sets forth the requirements of
the Notice of Claim which include:
(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting
forth the following information:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if
not known, the name of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed
or to whom he furnished the equipment or material;
(c)
the time when the first and last labor or
service was performed or the first and last equipment or
material was furnished;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for
identification; and
(e)
the signature of the lien claimant or his
12

authorized agent and an acknowledgment or certificate as
required under Chapter 3, Titled 57. No acknowledgment or
certificate is required for any notice filed after April 29,
1985, and before April 24, 1989.
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-7(2), (1953 as amended).
The exact procedure for verification has not been set by
statute but rather by recent case law.

The trial court properly

determined that the signature of the Notice of Lien was not
properly

acknowledged

as required

in Sect.

38-1-7(2)(e) and

therefore determined that it was invalid.
Plaintiff's Notice of Lien is invalid since it was improperly
acknowledged

since

the

claimant

signing

the

lien

did

not

acknowledge that the contents were true. However, in order to have
a valid verification it is the claimant, and not the notary, who
must sign that the contents are true.
The issue of the validity of the Plaintiff's Notice of Lien
has clearly been decided in Worthinaton & Kimball v., C & A Dev.
Co., 777 P.2d at 475.

In Worthinaton, "the lien claimant did not

sign a correct written oath in the presence of a notary. All that
he signed was the notice of lien.
contain an oath.

It. . . [did] not purport to

Affixed below the claimant's signature the

following certification appear[ed]:
STATE OF UTAH)
County of Salt Lake)
On this 13th day of January 1982, Personally appeared
before me Edwin N. Kimball [sic], who duly acknowledged to me
that he has executed this notice and that he has read the
contents thereof, that the same is true of his own knowledge.
13

/s/ Arnold Allred
Notary Public
residing at 6586 W. 3500 S.
(seal)
My Commission expires
18 Sept 85
The forgoing was not signed by the claimant, but was signed
instead by the notary public.

It is a cert if iccition by a notary

public that the claimant acknowledged /to him that he executed the
notice of lien, that he had read the contents, and that the same
were true.

However, in order to have a valid verification it is

the claimant, and not the notary, who must sign that the contents
are true."

Id. at 477.

In Worthinaton, the court determined that the Notice of Lien
was

not

properly

verified

requirements of the statute.

and

therefore

did

not

meet

the

The claimant was therefore denied

relief under the statute.
The case before this court has the same facts as Worthington.
Plaintiff's Notice of Lien was signed as follows:
FLOOR COVERINGS BY
CERTIFIED, INC.
/s/ Wavne Dudley
(SEAL)

Secretary

/s/ Alan Delahuntv
Authorized Officer

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
County of Salt Lake )
On this 19th day of January 1990, before me, the undersigned
notary, personally appeared Alan Delahunty, Vice President of Floor
Coverings by Certified, Inc., who is personally known to me (or
14

whose identity was satisfactorily proved to me) to be the person
who signed the preceding document in my presence and who swore or
affirmed to me that he signed it voluntarily for its stated
purpose, that the document is truthful, and that the document was
signed on behalf of said corporation by the authority of a
Resolution of the corporation's board of directors and acknowledged
that the corporation executed the same and that the seal affixed is
the seal of said corporation. [Emphasis added].
/s/
Notary Public
My Commission Expires: 3/22/92

(SEAL)

The claimant did not verify that the contents were true, but
rather the notary public claims that he was told they were true.
The fatal defect is that the claimant did not sign anything under
oath.

Under the rule determined in Worthincrton. the defect is

fatal and the Notice of Lien is invalid.
Utah courts have mandated that the Notice of Lien be properly
verified.

In Graff, 660 P.2d at 722, the court stated that "the

requirement of verification. . .is not a hypertechnicality that the
Court is free to discount, but that verification is a mandatory
condition precedent to the very creation and existence of a lien."
Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift. 798 P.2d

at 738.

Michelsen v. Craicrco. Inc.. 767 P.2d 561 (Utah 1989).
Plaintiff

sets

forth

In

re. . Williamson.

43

B.R.

813

(Bktrcy.Ct.D. Utah 1984) as a case which exhibits a similar lien
which was held to be enforceable.

The United States Bankruptcy

Court for the District of Utah is not controlling in this court.
The trial court properly held that the Notice of Lien was not
proper.

Plaintiff's

lien

was

improperly

mechanic's lien claim was properly denied.
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verified

and

the

III.

PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF FOR FAILURE TO OBTAIN

A CONTRACTORS BOND.
Plaintiff asserts that a judgment should have been entered
against the Defendants for failure to have a contractors bond.
However Plaintiff is not entitled relief based on Utah's payment
bond statute since this issue was not properly raised at trial in
order to preserve the issue for appeal and also since there was no
contract between Plaintiff and Defendant, and therefore the statute
does not apply in this case.

1.

Plaintiff May Not Raise Issues 6n Appeal Which Were Not

Properly Preserved at Trial.
Prior to trial, the Plaintiff's attorney and Defendant's
attorney
conference

attended

a

pretrial

conference.

At

the

pretrial

and after discussion by both attorneys the court

determined that the issues of the case be limited to certain issues
at trial.

The issues certified for trial were 1) Whether or not

the mechanics lien is valid, 2) Whether or not the invoice and lien
reflects the amount of carpet and linoleum installed in Defendant's
house, and 3) Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees and
how much.

(R. 158; 198-200)

Plaintiff did not object to the issues certified for trial at
any time prior to trial. However, Plaintiff now contends that the
court should have ruled in Plaintiff's favor on the basis of
failure to obtain a payment bond. Since the issue was not properly
presented to the court at trial, the court was proper in not making
16

a ruling that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment based on the
statute.
In Parker v. General Motors Corporation, 503 P.2d 148, 149
(Utah 1972), the court condemned the practice of parties trying to
resurrect issues rejected by the trial court.

In Parker, the

issues finally resolved by pre-trial conference were principally
negligence and breach of warranty.

After the case was set for

trial, plaintiffs received a hearing for the purpose of asking the
court for the third time to permit the issues that had been
rejected.

The court determined that under our procedural system,

last minute efforts to resurrect issues long since rejected by the
court is not allowed.

Id. at 149.

"Parties may limit the scope of the litigation if they choose,
and if an issue is clearly withheld, the court cannot nevertheless
adjudicate it and grant corresponding relief."

Combe v. Warren's

Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 736 (Utah 1984).
The parties in this case limited the issues to those set forth
in the Pre-trial Order.

If Plaintiff objected to the Pre-trial

Order, Plaintiff needed to timely file objections.

Making such

objections for the first time on appeal is improper.
Defendant relied on the Pretrial Order by

limiting the

evidence presented at trial- to the issues ordered by the court in
the Pretrial Order.

By not properly raising and presenting this

issue at the trial, Defendant was not given the opportunity to
present evidence which would refute any claim under the Bond
statute.

E.g., Defendant Stacey Morgan stated in his testimony
17

that he believed that Miles Construction Company had obtained a
payment bond.

If this was true there would be no need for

Defendant to obtain one, since the statute would be complied with.
See Pierce, et al. v. Pepper, et al.. 405 P.2d 345 (Utah 1965).
Since this issue was not raised in the Pre-trial Order, Defendant
did not present evidence which would refute Plaintiff's claim that
a payment bond was required.
Since the issues set for trial were limited to those set in
the Pre-trial Order, and Plaintiff did not timely object to those
issues Plaintiff is now barred from raising the issue on appeal.

2.

Utah's Payment Bond Requirement is not Applicable to Claimants

Not Party to a Contract.
Even if this court determines that Plaintiff properly raised
the issue of Defendant's requirement to obtain a Payment Bond in
order to preserve the issue for appeal, Defendant was not required
to obtain a payment bond since Plaintiff and Defendant never
entered into a contract.
Utah Code Ann. Sect. 14-2-1, (1953 as amended) provides that
"before

any

contract

exceeding

$2,000

in

amount

for

the

construction, alteration, or repair of any building, structure, or
improvement upon land is awarded to any contractor, the owner shall
obtain from the contractor a payment bond complying with Subsection
(3)."
Cases interpreting the statute have interpreted a literal
meaning to "before any contract" wording in the statute.
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The

courts have held that the bond statute requires that a contract be
formed between owner and contractor, otherwise a claimant is not
entitled to relief under its provisions.
In Bailev v. Parker, 778 P.2d 1005 (Utah App. 1989), the
Court found there was no contract and therefore no rights accrued
to plaintiff under this statute.

The court stated that "in order

to be a protected materialman under section 14-2-1, there must be
a contract between the property owner and the person with whom he
contracts, for the construction, alteration, or repair of a
structure, and materials supplied. . . . "

[Emphasis added].

Id.

at 1007. Lawson Supply Co. v. General Plumbing & Heating, Inc. 27
Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (1972).

See Matern v. Phillips, 335 P.2d

839 (Utah 1959), See Harries v. Valgardson, 432 P.2d 58 (Utah
1967).
Whether or not there was a contract is an issue of fact. The
trial court heard the evidence and determined there was no contract
between Plaintiff and Defendant.

(Amended Findings of Fact, p.2,

no. 8).
Since the trial court found that there was no contract between
the parties, it would be improper for relief to be granted based
upon the payment bond requirement of Utah Code Ann. Sect. 14-2-1
(1953, as amended).

3.

Utahfs Payment Bond Requirement is not Applicable when Less

than the $2.000 Minimum Requirement has been Met.
Even if this court finds that there was a contract between the
19

parties, Defendant has disputed that they owe Plaintiff more than
$2,000. The at trial, the issue of determining whether or not the
invoice and lien reflected the amount of carpet and linoleum
installed in Defendant's house was litigated. The lower court came
to the factual determination that the invoice or Lien did not have
the correct amount listed since the court held that $1,959.60 was
the proper amount owing Plaintiff.

Unless such a finding is

against the clear weight of the evidence, payment bond was not
required since the statutory $2,000 minimum requirement had not
been met.

Utah Code Ann. Sect. 14-2-1(2) (1953, as amended).

In sum, Plaintiff cannot be allowed to assert that the lower
court erred in not ruling that Defendant was required to obtain a
payment bond since 1) the issue was not proper preserved for
appeal, 2) the statute is not applicable to parties who have not
entered into a contract, and 3) the statute is not applicable
unless the $2,000 minimum requirement has been met.

IV.

PLAINTIFF CANNOT RAISE ISSUES ON APPEAL THAT WERE NOT PROPERLY

PRESERVED FOR APPEAL.
Plaintiff

asserts

that

Defendants

should

not have been

permitted to assert defenses at trial because they did not sign
their answer as required by Rule 11.

Defendant Stacey Morgan

signed the answer prior to trial and also, this issue was not
properly raised at trial in order to preserve the it for appeal.
On March 25, 1991, both Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant's
counsel attended a pretrial conference concerning this case.
20

In

that conference it was determined what issues would be presented
for trial.

Those issues include: 1) whether or not the mechanics

lien is valid, 2) whether or not the invoice and lien reflects the
amount of carpet and linoleum installed in Defendant's house and 3)
Whether either party is entitled to attorney fees and how much.
(Pre-trial Order, p. 2).
Before a party may advance an issue on appeal, the record must
clearly show that it was timely presented to trial court in manner
sufficient to obtain ruling thereon; issues not raised in trial
court in timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding Court of
Appeals from considering their merits on appeal. Salt Lake County
v. Carlston. 776 P.2d 653 (Utah App. 1989).
For a question to be considered on appeal, the record must
clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a
manner sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon.

Matters not

presented to the trial court.may not be raised for the first time
on appeal. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Develop. Co., 659 P.2d
1040 (Utah 1983).
"The burden is on the parties to make certain that the record
they

compile

review....11

will

adequately

preserve

their

arguments

for

Olson v. Park-Craiq-Olson. Inc. , 815 P.2d 1356 (Utah

App. 1991), quoting Franklin, at 1045.
In Estate of Wolfinger v. Wolfinqer. 793 P.2d 393 (Utah App.
1990) the Court determined that it could not properly base its
decision on legal issues not specified by parties in written Pretrial Order where no objection was made to introduction of evidence
21

which formed basis for court's resolution of case.

Id. at 395.

Last minute effort by party before trial to resurrect issues
previously rejected by trial court or to delay the trial on the
basis of issues that have been rejected was not allowed. Parker v.
General Motors Corporation. 503 P.2d at 149.
"Parties may limit the scope of the litigation if they choose,
and if an issue is clearly withheld, the court cannot nevertheless
adjudicate it and grant corresponding relief."

Combe, at 736.

Since the Pre-trial Order specified the issues to be litigated
at trial and the issue of the effect of an unsigned answer was not
included, such an issue cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.

V.

DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS PURSUANT TO

DEFENDANTS' CROSS APPEAL.
On cross appeal, Defendant requests attorney's fees and costs.
Defendant claims such right on the basis that:

1) Plaintiff's

appeal is frivolous and Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees
and double costs pursuant to Utah R. App.P. Rule 33, 2) Plaintiff
refused Defendants' settlement offer Which was more than what
Plaintiff received through judgment and therefore, pursuant to Rule
68(b), Defendant is entitled to a minimum of the costs incurred,
and

3) Defendant

prevailed

against

Plaintiff

concerning

the

Mechanic's Lien and therefore, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sect. 381-18 (1953, as amended), Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees
and costs.
22

1.

Plaintiff's appeal is frivolous and Defendant is entitled to

attorney's fees and double costs.
Under R. Utah Ct. App. 33, Plaintiff's appeal is deemed
frivolous when it is brought without reasonable legal or factual
basis Call v. Citv of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1056 (Utah App.
1990), Mauahn v. Mauahn. 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 1989).
Attorney's fees are allowed in egregious cases which are obviously
without merit, with no reasonable likelihood of success, and would
result in the delay of a proper judgment.

Id.

Plaintiff's appeal is without merit since the issues raised
have been well settled by Utah law and has resulted in the delay of
proper judgment and therefore Defendant respectfully requests the
court to grant attorney's fees and double costs.

2.

Plaintiff refused Defendants' Settlement Offer and therefore.

Defendant is Entitled to Costs Incurred.
Defendant is entitled to costs based on Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 68(b).

Defendants offered Plaintiff a settlement

prior to trial on May 7, 1991, in the amount of $1,950.00, plus
$1,000.00 attorney's fees, plus costs of constable and filing of
the Complaint.

Pursuant to U.R.C.P., Rule 68(b), since the offer

was not accepted and the judgment finally obtained by the Plaintiff
was not more than what was offered prior to trial, the Plaintiff
must pay costs incurred after the making of the offer and other
relief as defined by the statute.
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3.

Under Utah's Mechanic's Lien Law, Defendant Prevailed and is

Entitled to Attorney's Fees and Costs,
Defendant is also entitled to attorney's fees and costs based
on Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-17 (1953, as amended) and Sect. 38-118 (1953, as amended) since the statute requires that "[i]n any
action

brought

successful

to

party

enforce

any

shall be

lien under

entitled

to

this

recover

chapter
a

the

reasonable

attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as
costs in the action."

Id. 38-1-18.

". . . [T]he court shall

apportion the costs according to the right of the case. . . .
38-1-17.

Id.

Since Defendant prevailed on this action which was

brought to enforce a lien under Sect. 38-1-18, Defendant is
entitled to attorney's fees and costs.

CONCLUSION
Defendant

respectfully

requests

that

the

lower

Court's

decision be affirmed since Plaintiff's objections contained in this
appeal are without merit.

Plaintiff's assertion that the lower

court was barred from determining that there were defects in
Plaintiff's Notice of Lien is unfounded since such an issue is not
an affirmative defense but rather part of Plaintiff's prima facie
case.

Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant based on the

Mechanic's Lien statute and failure to follow the requirements of
the statute are not affirmative defenses but rather part of
Plaintiff's prima facie case.
Plaintiff's assertion that the trial court improperly denied
24

Plaintiff's

mechanic's

lien

claim,

on

the

basis

that

the

requirements of the statute were met since the Plaintiff proposes
that substantial compliance was met is unfounded since the Notice
of

Lien

was

not

properly

verified

and

therefore

invalid.

Plaintiff's Notice of Lien was not proper since the claimant,
rather

than

notary, must

sign that

the

contents

are true.

Plaintiff did not sign that the contents of the Lien were true, and
therefore according to recent case law, the Lien is invalid and
cannot be enforced.
Plaintiff's assertion that a judgment should have been entered
against the Defendants for failure to have a contractors bond is
unfounded.

Plaintiff is not entitled to relief based on Utah's

payment bond statute since this issue was not properly raised at
trial in order to preserve the issue for appeal and also since
there was no contract and less than $2,000 worth of goods and
services were received, and therefore the statute does not apply.
Plaintiff's assertion that Defendants should not have been
permitted to assert defenses at trial because they did not sign
their answer as required by Rule 11 is unfounded. Defendant Stacey
Morgan signed the answer prior to trial and this issue was not
properly raised at trial in order to preserve the it for appeal and
therefore, this issue is moot.
On cross appeal, Defendant requests attorney's fees and costs.
Defendant claims such right on the basis of: 1) Plaintiff's appeal
is frivolous and Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees and
double costs pursuant to Utah R. App.P. Rule 33, 2) Plaintiff
25

On cross appeal, Defendant requests attorney's fees and costs.
Defendant claims such right on the basis of: 1) Plaintiff's appeal
is frivolous and Defendant is entitled to attorney's fees and
double costs pursuant to Utah R. App.P. Rule 33, 2) Plaintiff
refused Defendants' settlement offer which was more than what
Plaintiff received through judgment and therefore, pursuant to Rule
68(b), Defendant is entitled to costs incurred, and other relief
defined by statute, and 3) Defendant prevailed against Plaintiff
concerning the Mechanic's Lien and therefore, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. Sect. 38-1-18 (1953, as amended), Defendant is entitled to
attorney's fees and costs.
Therefore, Defendant requests that this court affirm the lower
court's ruling and award Defendant attorney's fees and double
costs.
DATED this A\i"\

day of June, 199

A.

ste^encT
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee
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Steven C. Vanderlinden #3314
STEVEN C. VANDERLINDEN & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendants
1133 North Main, Suite 200
Layton, Utah 84 041
Telephone (801) 544-9930
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FLOOR COVERINGS BY CERTIFIED,
INC. ,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
STACY B. MORGAN and KRISTIN
P. MORGAN,

Civil No. 900747303CN
Judge Douglas L. Cornaby

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial on the 31st
day of May, 1991, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, District
Court Judge.

The Plaintiff was present and represented by his

attorney, Paul Franklin Farr. The Defendants were also present and
represented by their attorney, Steven C. Vanderlinden.

The court

having heard testimony by both parties, and their witnesses, and
having received exhibits as evidence, and the court having reviewed
the testimony

of the parties and good cause appearing, hereby

enters its
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That the Defendants are residents of Davis County, Utah.

2.

The

Plaintiff

was

a

corporation

duly

organized

and

validly existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its

EXHIBIT

principal place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah and
was, at all times relevant, in the retail floor coverings business
[hereinafter referred to sometimes as "Floor Coverings11].
3.

On or about the 15th day of November, 1989, Plaintiff

furnished the first materials and labor and, on or about November
17, 1989, Plaintiff furnished the last of said materials and labor
in performing the job [Invoice 2702] at the Property.
4.

The property

located at 773 South 825 East

in Davis

County, Utah [hereinafter the "Property"] was a residence, and the
Defendants1 closed on their purchase of the same on November 24,
1991.

Defendants were the owners of said Property at the tine the

Notice of Lien was recorded against the same.
5.

That Plaintiff thought the prices to be paid to them for

the installation and the purchase of the carpet was $11.25 and the
price to be paid for the purchase and the installation of vinyl was
$9.75.
6.
Plaintiff

That the Defendant thought that the price to be paid to
for the purchase and

installation

of the carpet was

$10.75 per yard and $9.75 per yard to purchase and install the
vinyl.
7.

That the Defendants believed they were entering into a

contract with

Don Smith

and the Plaintiff

believed

they

were

entering into a contract with the Defendants.
8.

That

no

contract

existed

Defendants.
-2-

between

the

Plaintiff

and

9.
me
W\
^,

On November 24, 1989, at the closing of the Defendant's

the Defendants paid Miles Construction Company Contractor

TOO.OO

for the purchase and installation of the carpet and vinyl

their home.
10.

In

June,

1990, Miles

Construction

Company

gave

the

ndants $1,500.00 for the carpet and vinyl that was purchased
their home so that the Defendants could send the money on to the
plaintiff.
11.

Plaintiff sent the Defendants an invoice

[Invoice No.

16702], relating to said job, shortly after the work was completed
S^n November 17, 1990 seeking the immediate payment of the same.
|Eke ar.ount asserted to be owing therein was $2,115.00.
12.

Since said

invoice was not paid

by Defendants, then

^Plaintiff mailed a Preliminary Notice of Intent to File a Lien to
^ h e Defendants about January 3, 1990.

On January 19, 1990, Floor

Coverings caused a Notice of Lien to be filed with the Office of
^the Davis County Recorder [Entry No. 880784, Book 1332, Page 818,
^tereinafter "Notice of Lien"].
13.

On June 12, 1990, Defendants sent Plaintiff a check for

V^, 040. 00 for

the carpet and vinyl purchased and installed in their

^*Owe by the Plaintiff.
14.

That the Plaintiff urged the Court to find an accord and

^^tisfaction pursuant to the Answer filed by the defendants on
^ r i l 9, 19 90.
^^Vch

15, 1990.

The Court did not do so.

This action was filed on

On March 23, 1990, Allen Delahunty and Stacy
-3-

Morgan met at the property.
remeasured.

A step was repaired and the floor was

At the conclusion the Plaintiff agreed

$75.00 from the bill due to its error.

to deduct

The balance due was

$2,040.00.
15.

That on June 26, 1990, the Court received the Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment, to strike Defendants' Answer, and for
default judgment.

Also filed on the same date was an Affidavit

signed by Alan Delahunty.

The Plaintiff's attorney also signed

this Affidavit wherein he claimed to have mailed a copy to the
Defendants on May 18, 1990.

That on June 10, 1990, the Defendants

mailed to Plaintiff's attorney, Paul Franklin Farr, a check for
$2,040.00

to

settle

the

matter.

The

Defendants

mailed

the

$2,040.00 check to the Plaintiff in an offer to settle the case,
although no writing expressed such intention.

The Court awarded

the Plaintiff judgment on August 1, 1990 for $2,040.00 plus $136.00
interest, plus lien costs $100.00, plus lien foreclosure costs of
$308.00, plus a reasonable attorney fee of $1,000.00.
was $3,584.00.

The total

The Plaintiff's counsel held Defendants' check

until after the judgment was awarded and then cashed it on August
7, 1990.

On October 11, 1990, Steven C. Vanderlinden made an

appearance for the Defendants and filed a Motion to Set Aside the
Summary Judgment.

On October 18, 1990, the Plaintiff caused a

public sale to be made of Defendants property pursuant to the
judgment.

The Plaintiff's attorney bid $3,855.10 at the public

sale, claiming that to be the amount owing.
-4-

The Court found the

actions of Plaintiff's attorney outrageous and granted a temporary
restraining order.
16.

That Defendants have acknowledged from the beginning that

they owed the Plaintiff money for the carpet and vinyl installed
in their home but have consistently claimed it was less than the
$2,115.00 claimed by Plaintiff.
17.

That the Plaintiff billed the Defendant for 50 yards of

vinyl at $9.75 per yard for a total of $487.50 and 130 yards of
carpet at $11.25 per yard for a total of $1,463.53.

The total for

both the carpet and vinyl was $1,951.00 before taxes, and $2,115.00
with taxes and $40.00 miscellaneous fees.
18.

That

after

the

liens

had

been

filed,

Plaintiff

acknowledged a $75.00 error in its calculations and stated that his
bill should be $2,040.00.
19.

That because there was no contracr between the parties,

and different prices were discussed, the Court determined that
$9.75 per yard for the purchase and installation of the vinyl is
reasonable and $11.25 for the purchase and installation of the
carpet is reasonable.
20.

Three expert witnesses were called on the total yardage

of carpet and vinyl installed in the home, none being a party to
the lawsuit.

Said witnesses testified that they went to the home

to measure the carpet.

Dennis Vanderlinden testified that there

was 121.3 yards of carpet installed with a value of $1,364.94, and
40 yards of vinyl installed for a purchase price of $390.00 and a
-5-

total price of the carpet and vinyl of $1,754.94.

David Searle

testified that there was 122.2 yards of carpet for a value of
$1,374-75 and 45 yards of vinyl for a value of $438.75 for a total
purchase price for both the carpet and vinyl of $1,813.50.

Dean

Chidester testified that there was 118.67 yards of carpet for a
value of $1,335.04 and 40 yards of vinyl for a value of $390.00 for
a total purchase price of $1,725.04.
21.

That the difference between the high and the low figures

testified to in court is approximately $150.00.
22.

That the difference in the amount owed is significant to

the Defendants.
23.

That the amount owed in the notice lien is incorrect.

24.

That no one testified as to whether cr not there was a

bond in place.
25.

However, the Court assumes that there was no bond.

That the lien statute does not require privity between

the parties and Plaintiff properly listed the Defendants as the
owner or reputed owner of the property.
26.

That the lien filed by the Plaintiff correctly stated

when the labor was performed, November 17, 1989, and gave a proper
description

of

the

property,

however,

the

signature

corporation is the signature of an officer only.

of

the

The corporate

officer does not state under oath that the contents of the lien are
correct.

The notary on the lien is the person who states "who

swore or affirmed to me that he signed it voluntarily, for its
stated purpose, and the document is truthful."
-6-

27.

That Plaintiff incorrectly listed the person by whom he

was employed even though he believed the Defendants were the ones
that hired him.
28.

That based on the above, the lien is unenforceable.

29.

Plaintiff is to be paid for unjust enrichment in the

amount of $1,800.00 plus $40.00 preparation and the appropriate
sales tax of $119.60 for a total amount to be paid of $1,959.60.
30.

That Plaintiff presently has in his possession $2,040.00

of Plaintiff's money meaning the Plaintiff

owes the

Defendant

$80.40.
31.

That each party is to bear their own attorney's fees and

costs incurred herein.
32.

That the previous sum deposited with the Court in the

amount of $3,855.10 is to be returned to the Defendants.
33.
1990,

Shortly after the work was completed

Plaintiff

immediate

mailed

payment

of

Defendants1

the

same.

Invoice
The

on November 17,

2702,

Plaintiff

seeking

asserted

the
that

$2,115.00 was the correct principal amount then due and owing.
34.

Thereafter, no payment was made by the Defendants within

the next thirty days.

As a result, Plaintiff contacted Defendants

to request payment.
35.

In this case no payment was thereafter made and Plaintiff

sent Defendants a Preliminary Notice of Intent to file a lien.
36.

In the sale of the carpeting for installation at the

Property, Plaintiff acted with the expectation of being compensated
-7-

therefor

in

an

amount

equal

to

the

materials and services furnished, and

reasonable

value

of

it was not acting

the
as a

volunteer.
37.

The Notice of Lien was filed within the time required by

the mechanics1

lien statute and on or about January 19, 1990,

Plaintiff mailed a copy of said Notice of Lien to Defendants by
certified mail.
38.

The Lien showed what the Plaintiff believed at the time

the Lien was prepared and recorded[that the principal amount due
and owing was the sum of $2,115.00].
The Court having entered its FINDINGS OF FACT, hereby enters
its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the District Court had jurisdiction over the above-

entitled matter.
2.

That Plaintiff's lien filed in the above-entitled lien

is void and unenforceable.
3.

That there was no contract existing between the Plaintiff

and the Defendants and therefore no bond was necessary.
4.

That the Plaintiff is entitled to the sum of $1,959.60

on the theory of unjust enrichment.
5.
Plaintiff

That

the

Defendant

has

previously

tendered

to

the

$2,040.00 leaving a net amount due and owing to the

Defendant of $8 0.40.

-8-

6.

That the Defendant is entitled to receive back the check

previously deposited with the Court in the amount of $3,855.10.
7.

That neither party is entitled to attorneyfs

fees or

court costs.
DATED this

day of

, 1991.

BY THE COURT:

Douglas L. Cornaby
District Court Judge
NOTICE
To:

Paul Franklin Farr
PAUL FRANKLIN FARR & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Busch Forum, Suite 540
5295 South 320 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-4711

You
Judicial
receipt
Judgment

are hereby notified that pursuant to the rules of the
Administration, Rule 4-504, you have five (5) days after
of these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Lav/ and
to file an Objection.

DATED this

zz

ru

day of

Qefai*,

1991.

en C. Vanderlinden

c:\wp\docs\mi sc\morgan.fof
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3
4

THE COURT:

The Court will make the following findings

and decision in this matter:

5

First, the Court does not find a contract between

6

the plaintiff and defendants.

7

testimony given to the Court that the defendants believed

8

they were contracting with Don Smith.

9

he was contracting with the defendants.

10

It's clear from the believable

The plaintiff believed

But the fact that they each believed they were

11

contracting with somebody else doesn't mean there's a

12

contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants.

13

Don Smith has not been made a party to this action,

14

so nothing the Court says with regard to him has any binding

15

effect on his legal interests.

16

has not been made a party to the action, and so, of course,

17

nothing I say has any binding effect on Miles Construction

18

Company.

19

Miles Construction Company

The defendants were not acting as agents for

20

Miles Construction Company.

Miles Construction Company was

21

the actual owner of the lot at the time the work was done.

22

They had entered into an earnest money agreement with the

23

defendants to purchase that lot —

24

purchase the lot and the house that was being built on it.

25

Richard Miles testified that having reviewed his
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or I should say to

^..*n

1

files, he could see where there was a $1,206 flooring

2

allotment.

3

Company which is a corporation determined that the amount

4

apparently had been agreed to be higher than that.

5

amount ultimately paid the defendants for that work was

6

$1500.

7

Apparently those who work with Miles Construction

The

The defendants became owners of the property on

8

November 24th, 1989, when the closing was signed.

No matter

9

what the defendants believed, the Court does not find that

10

Don Smith ordered the vinyl and carpet from the plaintiff,

11

nor was he an agent for the defendants.

12

air conditioning repaired, and the defendants agreed to

13

scratch his back if they, in turn, could get their back

14

scratched.

Don Smith needed his

15

Defendant Stacey Morgan has testified that he gave

16

him some air conditioning worth approximately 1200 for which

17

he paid $800, which in the company he had! a right to do.

18

for that, he just expected that the defendant —

19

defendant.

20

same thing for him when it came to carpeting.

21

carpeting, I mean carpeting and vinyl.

And

not the

He expected that Don Smith was going to do the
As I say,

22

I

I believe the actual agreement was that the

23

| defendants believed they were contracting with Don Smith.

24

| Don Smith was walking a tight rope.

25

I to believe that he was selling carpet without going through a

<YJP„ <&„„.„„ M;„£

He didn't want retailers

1

retailer, and so he went to the plaintiff and asked the

2

plaintiff to do him a favor by supplying carpet and vinyl to

3

the defendants at a given price.

4

The defendants have testified that they had a set

5

price of $10.75 per yard installed for carpet and 9.75 per

6

yard for vinyl.

7

Plaintiff on the other hand, and the Court's not

8

sure where he got his information from because Ifm not

9

persuaded he got it from the defendants.

I think he —

Well,

10

he may have got his information from Don Smith.

11

believed that he was to supply vinyl at 9.75 per yard, which,

12

of course, is the same, and carpeting at 11.25 per yard, each

13

of those being the installed price.

14

contract between the plaintiff and defendants.

15

But he

That means there's no

The defendants have acknowledged since this case

16

first began that they were —

17

at least at all times after November 24th, 1989, they were

18

the owners of the property.

19

house, they also paid Miles Construction Company for the

20

installation of the flooring; that the amount they were

21

talking about was $1500, though I'm not sure the defendants

22

even knew the figure at that time, but that's the figure that

23

Miles Construction ultimately gave them.

24
25

at the time the lien was filed,

That when they paid for that

Richard Miles who seems to say at the time that the
defendants were trying to get their carpet and vinyl
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1

installed, they had a figure of 1206 or $1,206 to work from.

2

In my finding I don't think it makes any difference.

3

Ultimately, they were paid man]^ months after this

4

action was filed.

5

defendants were paid $1500 by Miles Construction Company for

6

the flooring.

7

Probably in the month of June 1990, the

It's clear from the evidence that the carpet was

8

installed beginning on November 15th, 1989.

9

days to install it, was finished on November 17th, 1989.

10

It took three

It's clear the plaintiff has a regular procedure

11

which he used in this case to collect, which is when he

12

finishes a job, he bills the parties for it and expects

13

immediate payment.

14

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is the contract or at least

15

it's a contract form dated November the 8th, 1989, that is

16

sent to the —

17

defendants showing the amount of $2,115 due and owing.

18

I suppose it's a document that was sent to the

His next procedure he says is when he doesn't

19

receive pay as soon as he thinks he should, about 30 days

20

later, he makes a phone call, which he did.

21
22

That sometime after that, he sends them out a
preliminary notice that he's going to file a lien, and he did

23

I that on January 3rd, 1990, by Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.

24

| then he has a lien drawn which he files on January 19th,

25

11990, dated the same day which he asks specifically for the

<T/JL tf?„„..™ ^U;»£

And

1
2

amount of $2,115.
Now, there's been a considerable amount of

3

controversy here on what the value of the work done was. I

4

don't think there's any question from the testimony given

5

that the defendants believed that they were being charged too

6

much right from the beginning.

7

Plaintiff has urged the Court to find that there

8

was accord and satisfaction as evidenced by the answer filed

9

on April 9th, 1990, specifically the third paragraph which

10

said "On March 23rd, 1990, we reached an agreement with

11

Floorcoverings regarding disputed invoice and service."

12

Now, this action was filed on March 15th, 1990. I

13

don't recall right offhand the date the 2,040 was actually

14

sent. Wasn't it in June?

15

MR. FARR:

June.

16

MR. VANDERLINDEN:

17

THE COURT:

18

remember the dates?

19

MR. FARR:

20

THE COURT:

It was, your Honor.

Do you remember the dates?

Somebody

June 12th is when I received it.
Plaintiff received it on June 12th, of

21

course, and it was payable to Mr. Farr personally apparently

22

at his request.

23

document or that amount at apparently counsel's suggestion.

24

It was held until there was a judgment taken on the case.

25

I'm aware that the plaintiff accepted that

I And shortly thereafter, then it was applied toward the

<YM» fo- M:-L~~ —.-*-.

1

judgment.

2

If one looks at that as an accord and satisfaction,

3

certainly, then, the acceptance of that $2,040 ended the suit

4

right then and there for 2,040 for everything.

5

finds that there was no accord and satisfaction.

6

have been if the parties had been willing to agree at that

7

time.

8

The Court
There could

Defendants have acknowledged from the beginning

9

they owed some money.

They have disputed the amount.

Now,

10

the Court's allowed —

we've taken testimony from several

11

people.

12

the plaintiff testified that the vinyl was 50 yards at 9.75

13

or $9.75 per yard which is $487.50.

The plaintiff or at least Mr. Delahunty on behalf of

14

And all of these you're going to have, if my math

15

is right, my figures will be right.

16

just a math error.

17

And if they're not, it's

Carpet at 11.25 at 130 yards 1,462.50 for a total

18

of 1,950.

19

Plaintiff acknowledged an error in calculating the

20

carpeting which all of the parties have agreed was in error,

21

recalculated it and later giving a $75 credit to the

22

defendants.

23

the final amount at 11.25 per yard which is $1,387.47 plus

123.33 yards is the figure that I accepted as

24

J the vinyl makes it a total at that time of 1,874.94.

25

|

Now, through all of these calculations that I give

O/.W.
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1

to you, I'm always going to use the figures of 9.75 for the

2

vinyl and 11.25 for the carpet, irrespective of the fact that

3

the defendants testified they think there contract is for

4

10.75.

5

no contract between the parties.

6

be a reasonable amount to be awarded for the vinyl and 11.25

7

to be a reasonable amount to be awarded for the carpet.

I do that because I've previously found that there is

8

And I believe the 9.75 to

Dennis Vanderlinden figured carpet at 121.33 yards

9

which figures out at $1,364.97.

He figured the vinyl at

10

40 yards which comes to $390 for a total of $1754.97.

11

David Seare figured the vinyl at 42 yards —

12

45 yards.

13

"Does that mean 42 yards?"

14

45 yards to 48 yards."

15

42 yards.

16

He says give or take three yards.
And he said "No.

or

And I said
That means

So he distinctly said it didn't mean

That's my understanding.
I figured his at 45 because that is the figure he

17

used.

That's the figure he determined.

And when he gave

18

that testimony, he said that 45 yard measurement included in

19

the area of the cabinets and included the counting of pattern

20

match.

21

vinyl, $1374.75 for the carpet which was at 122.2 yards for a

22

total of $1813.50.

So David Seare figures I have at $438.75 for the

23

J

Dean Chidester figured the vinyl at 40 yards for

24

( $390, 118.67 yards of carpet for $1335.04 for a total of

25

| $1725.04.

So the difference between the high and the low,

3\zl£u
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1

this is just roughly $150 with four different people giving

2

the figures.

3

Now, the plaintiff has argued that as long as you

4

file a lien it doesn't matter how much you claim because

5

that's not important*

6

It seems to the Court it's just very essentially

7

important in a case of this nature.

The lien filed in this

8

case asks for $2,115. And apparently from the beginning, the

9

defendants are saying it's too high.

The plaintiff comes to

10

a point of acknowledging a math error and acknowledges it

11

should be $2,040 because it's $75 too high.

12

Different carpet measurers measure it differently.

13

And as I say, four of them have come up with four different

14

figures ranging from a high and a low to just $150

15

difference.

16

Now, for this total lawsuit, that seems almost

17

insignificant.

But to the defendants, it's not

18

insignificant.

You're talking about an allowance by Miles

19

Construction of $1500 for a total project, and in a claim by

20

the plaintiff for $2,040.

21

two. And I recognize I have not left —

22

off the taxes and the preparation fee that I think are

23

appropriate sums.

And this figure lies between the
I deliberately left

I just haven't included them on this

24

I because I would think that when we get through, the $40

25

| preparation and the sales tax need to be added onto this no

Mid

1 n

1

matter what figure the Court ultimately uses.

2

And I don't think Dennis Vanderlinden was

3

discredited in any way because he has been associated with

4

his brother.

5

Chidester or the plaintiff.

6

the Court can see, they were all four people trying to

7

honestly tell what they thought it looked like to them.

They're all very —

Now, with regard to the lien.

8
9

But then neither is David Seare or Dean

important aspect of this case.

as far as

That's a very

The amount in the notice of

10

lien is incorrect at $2,115.

11

view of it, it should be $2,040.

12

defendants were not the owners of the house at the time they

13

asked the work to be done.

14

contract for purchasing, and nobody's presented the Court

15

with a copy of that so I know whether it had been accepted by

16

Miles Construction so that it was a binding contract between

17

the parties.

18

it was because it wound up being on November 24th an actual

19

contract that was consummated.

20

binding on the plaintiffs prior if the house had been

21

appropriately finished as apparently they agreed on.

22

don't know concerning what their negotiations were in that

23

area.

Even in the plaintiff's best
I've said that the

But they had at that time a valid

But in ruling, the Court kind of assumes that

That doesn't mean it wasn't

We just

24

Now, the lien statute is there to protect anybody

25

who, in this case the plaintiff, supplies something to that

Tn/iTH

1

house, but that it requires a bond.

2

whether there was a bond in place in this case or not.

3

Court knows nobody's testified to no bond being in place,

4

And we really don't know
The

Miles Construction Company didn't want to be

5

responsible because they had not made the contract.

6

Don Smith didn't want to be responsible because he claimed he

7

wasn't selling either vinyl or carpet, just doing a favor by

8

persuading the plaintiff to do it.

9

protects those people furnishing it.

But the law still
And so the Court's

10

assuming there was no bond.

11

matter that with most homes that are personally built, there

12

are not bonds obtained for them even though the statute

13

requires it.

14

Of course, I know as a practical

Now, the lien was filed within a reasonable period

15

of time.

16

time after the work was done on November 17th.

17

doesn't really require privity.

18

contractor who subcontracts or who hires the work done, not

19

the owner.

20

and work on a job, the lien statute doesn't require there to

21

be a privity.

22

January 19th was reasonable within the statutory
The statute

Many times it's the

But to protect those people who supply material

The current lien statute, and that's 38-1-7, and

23

I'm not going to read the whole thing.

Paragraph (2) does

24

list those things, and I'm not going to read all of them that

25

the plaintiff listed in there.

It says the statement

<VJ?„ < £ > _ „ ^ / „ £ m Court Reoorter

12

1

containing the day; the reputed owner.

2

owner, if you don't know that, the record owner.

3

If not the reputed

I believe that was correctly stated at the time.

I

4

think the plaintiff had enough interest —

5

had enough interest in it and the plaintiff had no

6

association with the contractor/owner at the time.

7

when he checked the lien to see —

8

recorder and so onto see who was the owner, it was listed as

9

the defendants.

10

or the defendants

And that

or check the county

So I think he did that one properly.

The name of the person by whom he was employed.

I

11

think that on the lien statute, he, of course, lists Stacey

12

and Kristin Morgan, and the Court has found that to be

13

incorrect, but I did find that he believed that they were the

14

ones that hired him.

15
16

Under (c), the time the first and last labor was
performed*

He does list the 15th and 17th of November.

17

(d), description of the property.

18

there, and nobody has argued anything except that it's

19

correct.

20

There is one

(e), given considerable amount of argument about

21

that.

The signature of a lien claimant or his authorized

22

agent, and an acknowledgment or certificate is required under

23

Chapter 3, Title 57.

Then the statement "No acknowledgment

24

I or certificate is required for any notice after April 29th,

25

11985, and before April 24th, 1989."

3\E.[[u
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So that last sentence

rnurtQ^n,

1

has no application to this case because no work was done, no

2

lien was filed until after that period.

3

just the one statement, the signature of lien claimant or his

4

authorized agent and an acknowledgment or certificate.

5

So you're left with

It does show the authorized signature.

It's got

6

Floorcoverings by Certified Incorporated.

7

secretary signature and seal, and you've got the authorized

8

officer as Allen Delahunty, and then you've got it notarized.

9

It's got the

The Court understands that this is a deficient

10

certificate there.

11

information is true.

12

intended.

13

he signed it voluntarily for its stated purpose, that the

14

document is truthful," and that he signed it on before of the

15

corporation.

16

the notary, of course, saying that this officer said that to

17

him.

18

It doesn't really enter that the
I'm sure that's what the plaintiff

It does say "...who swore or affirmed to me that

I think that's deficient personally.

But it is

So I think there are three problems in the lien

—

19

notice of lien, and that's the ownership of the property, the

20

amount requested.

21

parenthesis it says "owner" and in another set of parenthesis

I'm not bothered by the fact that this

22

J it says "contractor."

Those are standard documents that are

23

I meant to have one or the other crossed out so that when you

24

| sign them, you know who you're referring to.

25

| it leaves them both there doesn't —

The fact that

the Court doesn't think

?rt P.nurt Renorter
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1

damages any.

2

those reasons.

So I think it's a deficient notice of lien for

3

I think the amount has to be correctly stated.

4

Now, I believe the plaintiff is entitled to be paid

5

for unjust enrichment, and the Court is not persuaded of

6

which of the four amounts submitted is better than another.

7

Whether it should be the lower figure of Mr. Chidester of

8

1725 or whether it should be the higher figure of the

9

plaintiff of 1875.

And so I think a good resolution of that

10

is just order an amount right between those two figures which

11

is probably $1800.

12

the $40 preparation plus the sales tax.

That will be the order of the Court, plus

13

And I think because of the nature of what I've said

14

about this, each party should bear their own attorney's fees.

15
16

Anything else?
MR. VANDERLINDEN:
I apologize.

Did you want me —

Excuse me.

17

stand up.

18

findings of fact and conclusions, your Honor?

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. VANDERLINDEN:

21

THE COURT:

22

Yes.

I'll

Do you want me to prepare the

You can prepare them.
Thank you.

All right.

Do you have all the exhibits?

Which ones do you or don't have?

23

THE CLERK:

I need Defendants' 3 and 5.

24

THE REPORTER:

25

MR. VANDERLINDEN:

Here you go.
I'll need a copy of his findings of

zn Court Rpnnrtpr

facts.
THE COURT:

Anything by either counsel before we be in

adjournment?
MR. VANDERLINDEN:
MR. FARR:
THE COURT:

Nothing on behalf of the defendant.

We have nothing, your Honor.
All right.

Court will be adjourned.

Thank you.

That's all.

The

The clerk will see that she has all

those documents before she quits.
(Whereupon, the court proceedings were concluded.)
* * * * *
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I further certify that I am neither counsel for
nor related to any party to said action nor in anywise
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS , STATUTES , ORDINANCES ,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules
and Regulations whose

interpretation

is determinative

to this

appeal and are set forth in this brief are as follows:
1.

Utah Code Ann. Sect. 14-2-1(2), (1953 as amended):
"(2) Before any contract exceeding $2,000 in amount for the
construction, alteration, or repair of any building,
structure, or improvement upon land is awarded to any
contractor, the owner shall obtain from the contractor a
payment bond complying with Subsection (3) . The bond shall
become binding upon the award of the contract to the
contractor.";

2.

Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-7(2), (1953 as amended):
Notice of claim—Contents—Recording—Service

on owner of

property.
"(2) This notice shall contain a statement setting forth
the following information:
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, if
not known, the name of the record owner;
(b) the name of the person by whom he was employed
D
to whom he furnished the equipment or material;
(c) the time when the first and last labor or
sendee
was performed or the first and last equipment or material was
furnished;
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for
identification; and
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his authorized
agent and an acknowledgment or certificate as required under
Chapter 3, Title 57. No acknowledgment or certificate is
required for any notice filed after April 29, 1985, and before
April 24, 1989.";
3.

Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-17 (1953 as amended):
"As between the owner and the contractor the court shall
apportion the costs according to the right of the case, but in
all cases each subcontractor exhibiting a lien shall have his
costs awarded to him, including the costs of preparing and
recording the notice of claim of lien and such reasonable
attorney's fee as may be incurred in preparing and recording
said notice of claim of lien.";

4.

Utah Code Ann. Sect. 38-1-18 (1953 as amended):

"In any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter
the successful party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable
attorneys1 fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed
as costs in the action.";
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33:
"(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines
that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court
may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the
party's attorney.
(b) Definitions.
For the purposes of these rules, a
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is
not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse
existing law.
An appeal, motion brief, or other paper
interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in
the cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only
the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c)

Procedures.
(1)
The court may award damages upon request of any
party or upon its own motion.
A party may request
damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's
motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to
a motion or other paper. . . .";

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8(b)(c):
"(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short
and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall
admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party
relies. If he is without knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth or an averment, he shall so
state and this has the effect of a denial.
Denials shall
fairly meet the substance of the averments denied. When a
pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a
qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it
as it true and material and shall deny only the remainder.
Unless the pleader intends in good faith to controvert all the
averments of the preceding pleading, he may make his denials
as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or
he may generally deny all the averments except such designated
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he
does so intend to controvert all its averments, he may do so
by general denial subject to the obligations set forth in Rule
11.

(c) Affirmative defenses.
In pleading to a preceding
pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and
satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk,
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress,
estoppel, failure of consideration, freiud, illegality, injury
by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res
judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver,
and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative
defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as
a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on
terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleadings as if
there had been a proper designation.11;
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11:
11

. . . A party who is not represented by an attorney shall
sign his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his
address. . . ."; and
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 68(b):
"(b) Offer before trial. At any time more than 10 days before
the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve
upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken
against him for the money or property or to the effect
specified in his offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10
days after the service of the offer the adverse party serves
written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may
then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with
proof of service thereof and thereupon judgment shall be
entered. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and
evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding to
determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the
offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must
pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer. The
fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude
a subsequent offer."

